Lena Davenport v. Borough of Homestead by unknown
2017 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-29-2017 
Lena Davenport v. Borough of Homestead 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017 
Recommended Citation 
"Lena Davenport v. Borough of Homestead" (2017). 2017 Decisions. 836. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017/836 
This August is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2017 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______ 
 
No. 16-3892 
______ 
 
LENA DAVENPORT, an adult individual 
 
v. 
 
BOROUGH OF HOMESTEAD, a Municipal Corporation;  
CITY OF PITTSBURGH, a Municipal corporation; IAN 
STRANG, individually and in his official capacities as a 
Police Officer of the Borough of Homestead;  
JAMES ILGENFRITZ, individually and his official 
capacities as a Police Officer of the Borough of Homestead; 
LOUIS SCHWEITZER, individually and in his official  
capacities as a Police Officer of the City of Pittsburgh; 
STEPHEN MATAKOVICH, individually and in his official 
capacities as a Police Officer of the City of Pittsburgh;  
CALVIN KENNEDY, individually and in his official 
capacities as a Police Officer of the City of Pittsburgh; 
THOMAS GORECKI, individually and in his official  
capacities as a Police Officer of the City of Pittsburgh, and; 
NATHAN HARPER, Commander, in his official capacity as 
a Chief of Police of the City of Pittsburgh;  
JEFFREY DESIMONE, in his official capacity as Chief of 
Police of Borough of Homestead, and; IGOR BOYKO, 
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individually and in his official capacity  
of a Police Officer of the City of Pittsburgh 
 
Louis Schweitzer; Stephen Matakovich;  
Calvin Kennedy; Thomas Gorecki, 
      Appellants 
______ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(W.D. Pa. No. 2-13-cv-00250) 
District Judge:  Honorable David S. Cercone 
______ 
 
Argued:  May 24, 2017 
Before:  HARDIMAN, ROTH, and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  August 29, 2017) 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 On an early Sunday morning in January 2013, Lena 
Davenport was riding in the front passenger seat of a vehicle 
driven by her son Donald Burris, Jr. After running a red light 
and refusing to pull over, Burris led police officers on a 
nearly five-mile low speed pursuit into the City of Pittsburgh. 
As the pursuit entered an area with high pedestrian traffic, 
City of Pittsburgh Police Officers Louis Schweitzer, Stephen 
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Matakovich, Calvin Kennedy, and Thomas Gorecki each 
opened fire on Burris’s vehicle. Davenport was struck by one 
of the officers’ bullets. She filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 against the officers and others alleging, inter alia, that 
the officers used excessive force in violation of both the 
Fourth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause. The District Court granted summary 
judgment on the basis of qualified immunity in favor of many 
of the defendants but denied it as to Schweitzer, Matakovich, 
Kennedy, and Gorecki, finding that their alleged conduct 
violated clearly established law. We will dismiss the appeal in 
part as to Gorecki and reverse in part as to Schweitzer, 
Matakovich, and Kennedy. 
I 
At about 1:38 a.m. on Sunday, January 13, 2013, 
Donald Burris, Jr. ran a red light in Homestead, Pennsylvania. 
Burris’s mother, Lena Davenport, was the only passenger in 
his car. When a Homestead police officer attempted to stop 
the car, Burris did not comply. Instead, a pursuit began, 
heading into the City of Pittsburgh. As Burris entered 
Pittsburgh’s South Side neighborhood on East Carson Street, 
several Pittsburgh police officers joined the pursuit. About 
1:42 a.m., as the pursuit reached a busy area, the Sergeant of 
the Pittsburgh Police Department called it off. 
Despite the Sergeant’s orders, officers deployed spike-
strips near the intersection of East Carson Street and 24th 
Street. It is undisputed that until reaching the 24th Street 
intersection, the pursuit did not jeopardize the safety of other 
motorists or pedestrians. However, in an attempt to avoid the 
spike-strips, Burris swerved between East Carson Street’s 
inbound and outbound lanes.  
As these events transpired, Officers Schweitzer, 
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Matakovich, Kennedy, and Gorecki were working approved 
off-duty security jobs at bars on East Carson Street. They 
heard about the pursuit through police radio communications. 
Near the 17th Street intersection, Schweitzer was the 
first to shoot at Burris’s car, opening fire after observing the 
vehicle swerve between lanes of traffic and drive toward him. 
He fired at the front of the vehicle three times and once more 
at the vehicle’s rear as it passed his position. At some point 
near this intersection, a bullet grazed a pedestrian’s back. 
Between the 16th and 15th Street intersections, after 
attempting to clear the street of pedestrians, Matakovich 
looked up and saw Burris’s car heading toward him from the 
opposite lane. He shot at the vehicle four times and claims he 
jumped out of the way to avoid being struck. Kennedy, who 
was standing near Matakovich, fired once at the vehicle. 
Burris again swerved between lanes and, upon reaching the 
15th Street intersection, side-swiped a parked car. 
As the pursuit approached the 14th Street intersection, 
Burris continued to swerve, hitting a car in the outbound lane 
and then returning to the inbound lane. Near the 13th Street 
intersection, at about 1:44 a.m., the pursuit ended when Burris 
collided with a taxicab. At or around the same time, Gorecki 
fired two shots directly into the driver compartment of the 
vehicle. The parties dispute whether Gorecki fired before or 
after the final collision. The taxicab’s dash-camera footage 
shows Gorecki’s conduct, but it is not clear from the video 
when he actually discharged his firearm. Minutes later, at 
1:47 a.m, paramedics arrived. They found Davenport on the 
floor of the vehicle’s passenger compartment, having 
sustained a single gunshot wound near her right eye. It is 
unclear which officer’s bullet actually struck Davenport. 
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At no time did the pursuit exceed forty-five miles per 
hour. Additionally, a forensic expert’s evaluation of the 
vehicle’s bullet holes indicates that one bullet was fired 
directly into the passenger compartment and another was 
fired after the vehicle’s airbags deployed. Importantly, it is 
unclear whether the airbags deployed before the taxicab 
collision. 
 Relevant to this appeal, Davenport brought suit under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Schweitzer, Matakovich, 
Kennedy, and Gorecki violated her Fourth Amendment right 
to be free from excessive force and her Fourteenth 
Amendment right to due process. The officers moved for 
summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The 
District Court identified two factual disputes that, in its view, 
required sending the claims against those officers to trial. The 
first was whether the officers intentionally or indiscriminately 
fired into the passenger compartment of Burris’s vehicle with 
knowledge of Davenport’s presence therein. And the second 
was whether the officers fired into the vehicle even though it 
posed little or no danger to themselves or others. A 
reasonable jury, the court held, could determine that, on 
January 13, 2013, the officers violated clearly established 
law. Davenport v. Borough of Homestead, 2016 WL 
5661733, at *19-22 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2016). The four 
officers appealed. 
II 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331. The collateral order doctrine provides us with 
jurisdiction to review the District Court’s denial of the 
officers’ claims of qualified immunity under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291, but only “to the extent that it turns on an issue of law.” 
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). 
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Insofar as the District Court’s order pertains to 
Schweitzer, Matakovich, and Kennedy, “we possess 
jurisdiction to review whether the set of facts identified by the 
district court is sufficient to establish a violation of a clearly 
established constitutional right.” Dougherty v. Sch. Dist. of 
Phila., 772 F.3d 979, 986 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). However, we lack jurisdiction to review the 
order insofar as it pertains to Gorecki because he challenges 
the District Court’s determination that the “pretrial record sets 
forth a ‘genuine’ issue of fact” for the jury. Johnson v. Jones, 
515 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1995); see also Monteiro v. City of 
Elizabeth, 436 F.3d 397, 405 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[W]hen 
qualified immunity depends on disputed issues of fact, those 
issues must be determined by the jury.”). Relying on the 
taxicab’s dash-camera footage, Gorecki argues that the 
District Court should have concluded that no reasonable jury 
could find that he discharged his firearm into Burris’s vehicle 
after the pursuit ended. Appellants’ Br. 17. And Gorecki’s 
legal challenges assume the absence of this otherwise 
disputed fact. Because we are unable to address the factual 
challenge about when Gorecki discharged his firearm at 
Burris’s vehicle at this stage of the proceedings, we are 
precluded from addressing the derivative legal challenges. 
See Johnson, 515 U.S. at 317 (“[A]n interlocutory appeal 
concerning this kind of issue in a sense makes unwise use of 
appellate courts’ time, by forcing them to decide in the 
context of a less developed record, an issue very similar to the 
one they may well decide anyway later, on a record that will 
permit a better decision.”). 
To the extent we have jurisdiction, we exercise plenary 
review over an appeal from a denial of summary judgment 
based on a lack of qualified immunity. Zaloga v. Borough of 
Moosic, 841 F.3d 170, 174 n.3 (3d Cir. 2016). We will 
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reverse if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To determine if there is a genuine 
dispute of material fact, we “view the underlying facts and all 
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to 
the party opposing the motion[.]” Dougherty, 772 F.3d at 986 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
III 
 Before reaching the merits of Schweitzer, Matakovich, 
and Kennedy’s qualified immunity defense, we must first 
address an error committed by the District Court—the court’s 
independent analysis of Davenport’s Fourteenth Amendment 
claims. See Davenport, 2016 WL 5661733, at *14-15. The 
Supreme Court has instructed that “all claims that law 
enforcement officers have used excessive force—deadly or 
not—in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 
‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth 
Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard, rather than 
under a ‘substantive due process’ approach.” Graham v. 
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). Therefore, an independent 
substantive due process analysis of an excessive force claim 
is inappropriate where, as here, the plaintiff’s claim is 
covered by the Fourth Amendment. See County of 
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843 (1998). 
 The Supreme Court has “express[ed] no view” on 
whether a passenger in Davenport’s position may recover 
under a Fourth Amendment theory. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 
S. Ct. 2012, 2022 n.4 (2014). And the federal appellate courts 
appear divided on the issue. Compare, e.g., Lytle v. Bexar 
Cty., 560 F.3d 404, 410 (5th Cir. 2009) (suggesting yes), 
Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F.3d 1323, 1328-29 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(same), Fisher v. City of Memphis, 234 F.3d 312, 318-19 (6th 
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Cir. 2000) (same), and Pittman v. Nelms, 87 F.3d 116, 120 
(4th Cir. 1996) (same), with, e.g., Medeiros v. O’Connell, 150 
F.3d 164, 169 (2d Cir. 1998) (suggesting no in the context of 
a hostage situation), and Landol-Rivera v. Cruz Cosme, 906 
F.2d 791, 794-96 (1st Cir. 1990) (same). See also Carabajal 
v. City of Cheyenne, 847 F.3d 1203, 1212 (10th Cir. 2017) 
(declining to address the issue and resolving the case on other 
grounds). Nevertheless, the majority of circuits have 
suggested that a passenger in Davenport’s position may seek 
relief under the Fourth Amendment; those circuits that have 
suggested otherwise reached their decisions on this issue 
before the Supreme Court decided Brendlin v. California, 551 
U.S. 249 (2007). 
 In Brendlin, the Supreme Court held that in 
intentionally stopping a vehicle, an officer subjects not only 
the driver, but also the vehicle’s passengers to a Fourth 
Amendment seizure. 551 U.S. at 254-56. It also made clear 
that an officer’s knowledge of a passenger’s presence in the 
vehicle is not dispositive because “an unintended person may 
be the object of the detention, so long as the detention is 
willful and not merely the consequence of an unknowing act.” 
Id. at 254 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
And in Brower v. County of Inyo, the Supreme Court 
cautioned courts not to “draw too fine a line” in “determining 
whether the means that terminates the freedom of movement 
is the very means that the government intended.” 489 U.S. 
593, 598 (1989). Accordingly, even if the officers’ intended 
application of force would have only incidentally seized 
Davenport, because her freedom of movement was terminated 
“by the very instrumentality set in motion or put in place in 
order to achieve” Burris’s and her detention, id. at 599, there 
is no set of facts that precludes a finding of a Fourth 
Amendment seizure. Today we join the majority of circuits in 
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holding that a passenger shot by an officer during the course 
of a vehicular pursuit may seek relief under the Fourth 
Amendment. Because Davenport may do so, the Fourth 
Amendment, “not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive 
due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” 
Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. Consequently, the District Court 
erred in independently analyzing Davenport’s Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendment claims. 
IV 
 “The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials 
from civil liability so long as their conduct ‘does not violate 
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which 
a reasonable person would have known.’” Mullenix v. Luna, 
136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting Pearson v. 
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). In resolving questions 
of qualified immunity, we conduct a two-part inquiry. First, 
“[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the 
injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct 
violated a constitutional right?” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 
194, 201 (2001). Second, we consider whether, in light of the 
specific context of the case, “the right was clearly 
established.” Id. Although we need not address these prongs 
in any particular order, Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236, we exercise 
our discretion to address both “[b]ecause we believe this case 
will clarify and elaborate upon our prior jurisprudence in 
important and necessary ways.” Williams v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t 
of Corr., 848 F.3d 549, 558 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).   
A 
 We first consider whether Schweitzer, Matakovich, 
and Kennedy’s alleged conduct violated the rights secured to 
Davenport by the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth 
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Amendment requires that a seizure be objectively reasonable. 
Graham, 490 U.S at 396-97. Determining objective 
reasonableness involves “a careful balancing of the nature 
and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth 
Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental 
interests at stake.” Id. at 396 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). The government has an interest in ensuring public 
safety, and a fleeing vehicle may pose a threat to that interest. 
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007). However, because 
our analysis “requires careful attention to the facts and 
circumstances of each particular case,” Graham, 490 U.S. at 
396, the fact that a vehicle is in flight does not necessarily 
render an officer’s use of deadly force objectively reasonable. 
The question is “whether the totality of the circumstances 
justified a particular sort of . . . seizure.” Tennessee v. Garner, 
471 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1985). We evaluate each officer’s conduct 
“from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, 
rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight,” understanding 
that “officers are often forced to make split-second 
judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and 
rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary 
in a particular situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97. 
 Based on Davenport’s version of facts, the District 
Court concluded that a reasonable jury could find that the 
officers intentionally shot at Davenport and that the pursuit 
posed no serious threat of immediate harm to others. This was 
error, as these assertions are “blatantly contradicted by the 
record.” Scott, 550 U.S. at 380. First, video evidence 
indisputably shows a heavy pedestrian presence during the 
course of the pursuit. And second, throughout the pursuit 
Burris continuously swerved between inbound and outbound 
lanes, which ultimately led to his colliding with three other 
vehicles. Considering the serious threat of immediate harm to 
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others, no reasonable jury could conclude that the officers 
fired at the vehicle for any reason other than to eliminate that 
threat. 
 Schweitzer shot at the vehicle with the knowledge that 
Burris refused to yield to officers’ continued pursuit and 
swerved between lanes in an area with high pedestrian traffic. 
Matakovich and Kennedy shot at the vehicle with the 
additional knowledge that Burris continued the dangerous 
vehicular pursuit despite sustaining police fire. Given the 
serious threat of immediate harm to East Carson Street’s 
many pedestrians, even if the officers knew that a passenger 
was in the vehicle, their conduct was objectively reasonable 
as a matter of law. See id. (In “weighing the perhaps lesser 
probability of injuring or killing numerous bystanders against 
the perhaps larger probability of injuring or killing a single 
person,” courts must “take into account . . . the number of 
lives at risk.”). As such, Schweitzer, Matakovich, and 
Kennedy are entitled to summary judgment because they did 
not violate Davenport’s Fourth Amendment rights. 
B 
 There is an additional and distinct basis on which we 
must reverse the District Court’s denial of qualified immunity 
to Schweitzer, Matakovich, and Kennedy—their alleged 
conduct did not violate clearly established law. The crux of 
the “clearly established” analysis “is whether officers have 
‘fair notice’ that they are acting unconstitutionally.” Mullenix, 
136 S. Ct. at 314. In other words, an officer is not entitled to 
qualified immunity if “at the time of the challenged conduct, 
the contours of [the] right [were] sufficiently clear that every 
reasonable official would have understood that what he [was] 
doing violates that right.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 
741 (2011) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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“We do not require a case directly on point, but existing 
precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional 
question beyond debate.” Id. “The dispositive question is 
whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly 
established. This inquiry must be undertaken in light of the 
specific context of the case, not as a broad general 
proposition.” Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the specific question 
presented by this case is whether, on January 13, 2013, the 
law clearly established that an officer who, in an attempt to 
eliminate the serious threat of immediate harm to others 
created by a vehicle’s flight shoots the vehicle’s passenger, 
violates that passenger’s rights under the Fourth Amendment. 
We hold that it did not. 
 The District Court concluded that Tennessee v. Garner 
clearly established that the officers’ alleged conduct was 
unlawful. See Davenport, 2016 WL 5661733, at *20. Garner 
held that a “police officer may not seize an unarmed, 
nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead.” 471 U.S. at 11. 
The Supreme Court, however, has applied Garner’s “general” 
test for excessive force in only the “obvious” case. Brosseau 
v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004) (per curiam). And 
courts have found “obvious” cases only in the absence of a 
serious threat of immediate harm to others. See, e.g., Lytle, 
560 F.3d at 417 (finding an obvious case where an officer 
shot a passenger in a vehicle without a sufficient threat of 
harm to others); Adams v. Speers, 473 F.3d 989, 991-94 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (finding same where, without a sufficient threat of 
harm to others, an officer shot a fleeing suspect on the 
highway and by using deadly force actually created a serious 
hazard for himself and the suspect); Smith v. Cupp, 430 F.3d 
766, 773, 776 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding same where, without a 
sufficient threat of harm to others, an officer shot an 
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intoxicated suspect who took control of a patrol car in a 
parking lot); Vaughan, 343 F.3d at 1331 (finding same where, 
without a sufficient threat of harm to others, an officer shot 
suspects who were merely evading arrest).  
 In concluding that this was such an “obvious” case, the 
District Court improperly ignored the serious threat of 
immediate harm to others posed by Burris’s flight. The 
District Court justified limiting its analysis to the threat of 
harm posed by Davenport’s conduct by citing Plumhoff v. 
Rickard for the proposition that “Fourth Amendment rights 
are personal rights that may not be vicariously asserted.” 
Davenport, 2016 WL 5661733, at *21. But acknowledging 
the threat of harm posed by Burris’s flight neither enhances 
nor diminishes Davenport’s Fourth Amendment rights. 
Rather, as discussed above, see Part IV-A, supra, it is a 
necessary factor of our “objective reasonableness” analysis. 
Given the serious threat of immediate harm to others that 
Schweitzer, Matakovich, and Kennedy sought to eliminate, 
Garner does not clearly establish their alleged conduct 
violated Davenport’s constitutional rights. 
The Supreme Court has never addressed the rights of a 
passenger involved in a dangerous vehicular pursuit. And 
while, in the absence of applicable Supreme Court precedent, 
we may consider “a robust consensus of cases of persuasive 
authority,” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742 (internal quotation marks 
omitted), Davenport cites no precedent from this Circuit, or 
any other, that is on point. Given this near absence of cases, 
we cannot conclude that Schweitzer, Matakovich, and 
Kennedy acted in a plainly incompetent manner when they 
attempted to address the serious threat of immediate harm to 
others posed by Burris’s flight. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. 
Ct. 1843, 1867 (2017) (“[Q]ualified immunity protects all but 
the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the 
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law.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
* * * 
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the District 
Court will be reversed in part and the case remanded with 
instructions to enter summary judgment on the basis of 
qualified immunity in favor of Schweitzer, Matakovich, and 
Kennedy. The appeal will be dismissed in part for lack of 
jurisdiction with respect to Gorecki. 
